In this paper, we consider a three-person silent marksmanship contest. Each of three players 1, 2 and 3 has a gun with exactly one bullet which may be fired at any time on [0, 11 aiming at his own target. The accuracy function Ai(X) for player i is strictly increasing and differentiable with Ai(O) = 0 and Ai(l) = 1. The first player hitting his target gets payoff +1 and other two players get payoff zero. For the game, we get a Nash equilibrium point and equilibrium payoff for each player. The form of the Nash equilibrium point differs whether At (x)/A 2 (x)A leX),
We consider the three-person silent marksmanship contest. There are three players 1, Z and 3, and each player has a gun with exactly one bullet which may be fired at any time on [ as one of the players htts his target, the contest ends and the first player hitting his target gets payoff +1 and other players get payoff zero. If none of the players hit their targets or some players hit their targets at the same time, then the payoff is zero for every player.
Since the contest j.s silent, none of the players can know whether the other players have fired their bullets or not. Furthermore, every player has only one byllet, and thus, a pure strategy for each player is determining his firing time. A mixed strategy for each player is a distribution function over Thus, we have
for all x in [a, b] . Similarly, we get (2) and (3), we get
By differentiating (5) with respect to x, we obtain
We have assumed that
are strictly decreasing, or equivalently,
It is easy to show that the equation Then as player 1 has fired his bullet before time b, we have
for all x in (b, 1). 11: follows, from (4), (5) and (8), that
Similarly, we get
In this case, et Note that the simultaneous equations 
and
Let a be the maximum value of a .. such that 0 < a .. < b . . < 1 and let b be the
corresponding value of b... Then a set of equilibrium strategies is given as
follows: ( 
and a~ = 0. Moreover, if a = a 3l , then a! ° and a~ ~ ° and if a = a 32 , then a! ~ ° and a~ = 0.
In all these cases, the e,quilibrium payoff V. for player i is A. (a).
~ ~
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume a = a 12
. Let Mi(x) be the expected payoff for playe,r i when he plays a pure strategy x and other two players play the strategies described in Theorem 1. We have already shown
It is easy to see, for i = 1, 2 and 3, that
Furthermore, we have
A2 (x)A 3 (x)
since Al (x)/A 2 (x)A 3 (x) is decreasing. Thus, for i = 1, 2 and 3, we have
This terminates our proof. 1] and at time 1 with some probability which may be zero. This is a generalization of the results for the two-person silent contest.
In this seetion, we assume that A 3
We shall seek for a Nash equilibrium point in the following class of strate-· gies: 
for b < x < 1. By means of (11), (12) and (13), (14) and (15) become as follows:
and from (17), we get and
In this case, a Z ' a 3
, a a~d b are determined as follows:
We note that the simultaneous equations (1 < i, j < 2, i '" j) be the roots of the simu1tan,eous 
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